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OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE·

Plaintiff objects to major portions of the Concise Statement of Facts by the Defendants.
Attached to Appellants' Brief are Appendix A, B, C and D. Appendix A is the Decision on
Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike which is included in the Clerk's Record. R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-39.
Appendix D is a copy of the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.
Appendix B is a Decision on Motion to Reconsider dated May 30,2013 which is not
included in the standard record on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 28(b)(1). However, Plaintiff does
not object to the inclusion of the Court's Decision in the record so that the Court, on appeal, may
know the Court's reasoning. The Plaintiff hereby stipUlates that the May 30,2013 Decision on
Motion to Reconsider is to be included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal and that the Clerk's
Record, as so augmented, shall be included by stipUlation. LA.R., Rule 29(a).
Appendix C contains uncertified copies of a Utah Complaint with Exhibit A, Promissory
Note and Exhibit B, Guaranty. These documents were not included as part of the Clerk's Record
on Appeal. The Defendants' are improperly attempting to augment the record by attaching the
documents to the Appellants' Brief.

In the Notice of Appeal, Defendants state that they do not request any Clerk's Record in
addition to those documents that are automatically included under LA.R., Rule 28(b )(1). R., Vol.
1, pp. 43, '6. The Defendants did not request additional documents after lodging ofthe Clerk's
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Record pursuant to LA.R., Rule 29(a). Defendants have not filed a motion to augment the record
upon appeal pursuant to LA.R., Rule 30(a). There are numerous references in the Appellants'
Brief to Appendix C which are not otherwise substantiated by the record. Plaintiff objects to
facts based upon references to Appendix C set forth in the Appellants' Brief at page 3, last
paragraph; page 4, first paragraph, second paragraph, and third paragraph.
In addition, the Appellants' Brief contains numerous references which are not supported
by the record. Plaintiff objects to page 3, second paragraph of the Brief on Appeal. In support of
this paragraph, Defendants cite only portions ofthe record at Tr. (sic) 29-32 which is nothing
more than a reference to the log of exhibits submitted and the Court's disposition of objections.
Likewise, page 5, second paragraph of the Appellants' Brief states alleged property values and
tenant notices which are not supported by the record and are disputed. The Plaintiff objects to
these and other references to these matters throughout the Appellants' Brief.
Plaintiff also obj ects to Defendants' arguments based upon the Appendix C and the
statements not supported by the record. For example, in Part III of Defendants' Argument,
Defendants' arguments are based upon the allegations of the provisions of the Utah Complaint
and isolated terms of the Guaranty which are not in the record.
The essential facts and the course of proceedings are set forth in detail in the May 30,
20 l3 Decision on Motion to Reconsider which are independently supported by the record. The
Judgment of the District Court dated June 21, 2013 is in Case No. CV 2012-658 (R., Vol. I, pp.
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46-47), which case commenced with the filing of the Petition in Support of Filing Foreign
Judgment. R., Vol. I, pp. 11-21. The Utah judgment was granted to the Plaintiff upon default
"on all its causes of action" and with the Court specifically finding that the "Defendants procured
the loan through fraud and/or misrepresentation." R., Vol. I, pp. 13-14. The Utah Court awarded
the Plaintiff damages and attorney's fees and costs. Id.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Supreme Court can consider matters and materials which are not
supported by the record or not contained in the record.

2.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Decision and Judgment below is based upon the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment Act (EFJA), Idaho Code §10-1301 - §10-1308 and case law. On appeal, the Court
exercises free review of the District Court's interpretation of the statute.
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we
exercise free review. When construing a statute, the words used
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the
statute must be construed as a whole."

Athay vs. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897,902 (2005) (citations omitted).
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ARGUMENT

1.

ALLEGED FACTS AND MATTERS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
OR NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD ARE NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE
COURT

As noted, Plaintiff objects to the statements and arguments by the Defendants not
supported by the record or not contained in the record. Statement of facts and arguments which
are not supported by the record are not reviewable on appeal.
"However, notwithstanding that this issue was not raised at the
district court and appears first on appeal, it is well settled that error
will not be presumed, but must be shown affirmatively by the
appellant on the record" (citations omitted). The burden is
therefore upon the appellant to have presented to this Court a
record sufficiently complete to support a specific allegation of
error." (emphasis provided).

Credit Bur., Inc. o/Georgia vs. Harrison, 101 Idaho 554, 556, 617 P.2d 858,860 (1990).
"This Court is bound by the record on appeal and "cannot consider
matters or materials that are not part of the record or not contained
in the record." Chisholm vs. Idaho Dep 't o/Water Res., 142 Idaho
159, 162, 125 P.3d 515, 518 (2008) (citing State ex. reI. Ohman vs.
Ivan H. Talbot Fam. Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 827, 820 P.2d 695,697
(1991)). Items attached to a party's opening brief are not part of
the record and cannot be considered. McLean vs. Cheyovich
Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 430-31, 283 P.23d 742, 747-8
(2012); Goodman Oil Co., vs. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc.,
147 Idaho 56, 59, 205 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009).

Kootenai County vs. Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 13, _, 293 P.3d 637,640 (Idaho, 2012).
Rehearing denied. The factual references and arguments based upon Appendix C attached to the
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Defendants' Brief and other matters not supported by the record cannot be considered on this
appeal.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

In Part I of their Argument, Defendants argue that the Motion for Reconsideration

requires a showing of new evidence or law citing generally the vintage case of JI Case

Company vs. McDonald, 76 Idaho 1070,280 P.2d 1070 (1955). The case provides no such rule.
JI Case Company vs. McDonald stands as authority for Courts to reconsider their interlocutory
orders or orders prior to the expiration of time for appeal based upon inherent powers of the court
or statute or rule. As stated by the Court:
"The general rule applicable here is set out in 60 C.J.S., Motions
and Orders §62, as follows:
In the exercise of this power, a court, while it still retains
jurisdiction over the cause in which the order was made, may, for
sufficient cause shown, amend, correct, resettle, modify, or vacate,
as the case may be, an order previously made and entered on
motion in the progress of the cause or proceeding; and a statute
empowering a court to modify its orders should be liberally
construed. "

Id. 76 Idaho at 21, 232, 280 P.2d 1075. A Motion for Reconsideration is also supported by the
specific authority of LR.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(2)(B). A presentation of new evidence is not required.

Johnson vs. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). As stated by the Court:
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"None of these authorities preclude reconsideration of a trial
court's interlocutory decision on the bases of the initial evidence.
Indeed, a rule requiring new evidence on a motion for
reconsideration would be a cause for concern. It would prevent a
party from drawing the trial court's attention to errors or law or
fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even flagrant
errors except through an appeal."
Johnson at 143 Idaho 473, 147 P.3d 106. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration requested the
Court to enforce the Utah judgment based upon an analysis of1.R.C.P., Rule 58(b) and the
concept of res judicata. These concepts were not part of the Court's prior decision. The decision
to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests on the sound discretion of the trial
Court. ld. The argument by the Defendants is not supported in fact or by law.
The Defendants, in Part II of their argument at page 8-9, state as follows:
"While it is not disputed in this appeal that the Araves did not have
an ownership interest in the Property that was foreclosed upon, it is
undisputed that the Property was foreclosed upon as part of
Plaintiffs efforts to collect on the Utah Judgment."
The last portion of this statement is not supportable in fact and is disputed. The
foreclosure was to collect upon the judgment of foreclosure granted against the sole debtor. R.,
Vol. 1., pp. 33-34. The Defendants were not a party to the action. The basis for the judgment of
foreclosure against the debtor was the promissory note. The basis ofthe judgment against the
Defendants is their guaranty and for defrauding the Plaintiff. While Idaho Code § 1302 provides
that a judgment is subj ect to the "same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening,
vacating or staying ajudgment...", Defendants have cited no such procedure for relief. Certainly
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the LR.C.P, Rule 58(b) Motion is not such a procedure as demonstrated in Part III hereof.

In Part III ofthe Appellants' Brief, at page 10, Defendants, while claiming they are not
challenging the merits of the Utah judgment, they then cite terms of the guaranty in support of
their Rule 58(b) Motion. Plaintiff has objected to this entire argument based upon Appendix C
and which is not supported by the record. If Appendix C is allowed, the Plaintiff will then be
entitled in fairness to assert its defenses based upon the terms and waivers set forth in the
guaranty as itemized in oral argument before the District Court. See. Tr., pp. 11-17.
Furthermore, Defendants also fail to recognize the preclusive effect of a merger upon a
final judgment.

In Markin vs. Grohman, 153 Idaho 223, 280 P.3d 726 (Idaho 2012), the Court, based
upon California law, explained the concept of merger of a promissory note and other agreement
into a judgment as follows:
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an
action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be
asserted in a subsequent lawsuit.. .. " Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto
Co., 28 Ca1.4th 888, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432,51 P.3d 297,301-02
(2002). When a cause of action is merged into the judgment, the
cause of action is extinguished. Busick v. Workmen's Compo
Appeals Bd., 7 Ca1.3d 967, 104 Cal.Rptr. 42, 500 P.2d 1386, 1392
(1972). In addition:
The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to
be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated,
or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to
litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent.
7

Public policy and the interest oflitigants alike require that there be
an end to litigation.
Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Ca1.2d 636, 134 P.2d 242,
243 (1943).
Thus, the California judgment extinguished Plaintiffs cause of
action based upon the promissory note and the settlement
agreement."
Markin at 153 Idaho 227-228,280 P.3d 730-731.
The principals of res judicata apply equally in cases of default judgment. See Waller vs.
State, Idaho Dept. O/Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 238 P.3d 1058, 1062 (Idaho 2008).
The Defendants failed to defend and the Utah judgment is final.
"In Idaho, the doctrine of res judicata means that "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the
former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but
also every matter which might and should have been litigated in the
first suit"."
(citations omitted). Magee vs. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152 Idaho 196, 202, 26 P .3d 464,
468 (Idaho, 2012).
Res judicata claim preclusion prevents litigation of all defenses that were previously
available to the Defendants regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior
proceeding.
"In Idaho, the doctrine of res judicata means that" in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the
former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to
8

every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but
also every matter which might and should have been litigated in the
first suit." Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878
P.2d 762, 769 (1994) (quoting Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation
Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553,208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922))."
VJ Magee vs. Thompson Creek Mining Company, 152 Idaho 196,202268 P.3d 465,470 (Idaho,
2012); See also In RE: Antonie, 432 RR. 843, affirmed 447 RR. 610 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2010).
While claiming that they are not, the Defendants are in fact requesting the Court to look
to the original transaction and now modify the final judgment awarded to the Plaintiff. The
Defendants now wish to assert claims and defenses which they could have asserted in the Utah
action which they chose not to litigate. "Final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject
to collateral attach". Kukuruza vs. Kukuruza, 120 Idaho 630, 632, 818 P.2d 334,336 (Ct. App.,
1991). Such relief is certainly not appropriate upon Defendants' motion pursuant to LR.C.P.,
Rule 58(b) which rule does not provide authority to the Court to grant such relief to the
Defendants from the final judgment they chose not to defend. They are attempting to re-litigate
claims they chose not to litigate which are now precluded by res judicata.
"Here, there was personal jurisdiction and the opportunity was
given to fully and fairly litigate the issue. Bums cannot take
advantage of his own failure to raise issues in the proper forum.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Underwriters, "A party
cannot escape the requires of full faith and credit and res judicata
by asserting its own failure to raise matters clearly within the scope
ofapriorproceeding." 455 U.S. at 7109,102 S. Ct. At 1369,71
L.Ed.2d at 574.
Burns vs. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 485-486, 65 P.3d 502,507-508 (Idaho 2003). The Utah
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judgment is also entitled to full, faith and credit. The Defendants cite no authority supporting
their claim to the relief requested.
Defendants did not present any citations of authority or argument in support of Issue
Number 4 listed at page 6 of the Appellants' Brief An issue on appeal which are not supported
by argument and authority in the opening brief will not be considered. Security Financial Fund,
LLC vs. Thomason, 153 Idaho 343, 282 P.3d 604, rehearing denied (Idaho, 2012).
ID.

THE MOTION BY THE DEFENDANTS' SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Defendants' Motion to Compel Satisfaction by Defendants is based upon the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58(b) which provides as follows:
"Rule 58(b). Satisfaction of Judgment. Upon full payment of a
judgment, the party in whose favor the judgment was rendered
shall have the duty to record a satisfaction of judgment in every
county where the judgment or abstract ofthe judgment is recorded
and to file it in the court of entry. A satisfaction of judgment may
be signed by the attorney of a party in whose favor the judgment
was entered."
Defendants cite Boller vs. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc., 119 Idaho 1060, 812
P.2d, 1221 (Idaho Ct. App., 1990). R., Vol. I, pp. 37. LR.C.P., Rule 58(b) does not apply and
Boller is distinguishable. In Boller "the plaintiffs foreclosed lien interests they held in two
parcels of property owned by the judgment debtors." Id. In this matter, the Defendants are not
the judgment debtor whose interest in property was foreclosed. Defendants have demonstrated
no ownership interest in the property foreclosed.

10

An additional reason that the Defendants are not entitled to a satisfaction under LR.C.P.,

Rule 58(b) is that the Utah judgment is based upon independent and different causes of action
which are separate from the basis of the judgment against the debtor. The Utah Court
specifically awarded judgment based upon the fraud and/or misrepresentation of the Defendants.
The Defendants did not defend against the Utah Complaint and the judgment is final.
The Defendants' Motion based upon LR.C.P., Rule 58(b) fails to account for the different
causes of action. In the analogous case of Bank of Oklahoma, NA. vs. Red Arrow Marina Sales
& Service, Inc., 224 P.3d 685 (Okla, 2009), a guarantor was not entitled to avoid a fraud claim by

a lender on the basis the debt under the loan had been extinguished by statute. In Bank of

Oklahoma, the bank, upon the default of the debtor, filed suit against the mortgagor and the
guarantor on their contracts and for fraud. 224 P.2d at 690. After the foreclosure, the bank did
not seek a deficiency which the Defendants claim precluded recovery on the remaining claims
including the claims for fraud. 224 P.2d at 685. The Court held that the bank was not precluded
in its fraud cause of action as follows:
"The question of first impression tendered on certiorari is whether
a mortgagee's failure to seek a deficiency determination against a
mortgagor ever can defeat the mortgagee's separate claim against
the mortgage debtor, the guarantor or a third-party defendant for
fraud in the inducement of the loan. We answer this question in the
negative. No legal principle will allow the defeat of a fraud claim
against any party by interposition of the mortgagee's failure timely
to impose deficiency liability on the mortgagor.
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Plaintiff in a fraud action does not seek satisfaction of the
mortgage debt. Rather, it seeks compensation for a tortuous
wrong. The fraud claim stands completely apart from the mortgage
debtor's now-satisfied obligation on the note. Bank's quest for
fraud recovery may not now be frustrated by interposition of a
statute wholly inapplicable to the satisfaction of the harm
remediable only in tort.
(Emphasis supplied) 224 P.2d at pp. 694-697.
Pursuant to a straight forward LR.C.P., Rule 58(b) analysis based upon the face of the
Utah jUdgment, the Motion should have been denied by the District Court. Where an order of
lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the
correct theory. Foremost Insurance Co., vs. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138,627 P.2d 317 (1981);
Revello vs. Revello, 100 Idaho 829, 606 P.2d 933 (1979); Eimco Corp. vs. Sims, 100 Idaho 390,
598 P.2d 538 (1979); Anderson & Nafziger vs. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709
(1979).
The District Court based its decision on the EFJA. The underlying cause of action and
the additional defenses to the Plaintiff based upon the terms ofthe guaranty, are not relevant to a
decision based upon LR.C.P., Rule 58(b) or the EFJA.
IV.

THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

The Utah Judgment is a final judgment and entitled the full faith and credit upon the
filing the Judgment in Idaho pursuant to the EFJA. Idaho Code §10-1301 et. seq.
"A valid final judgment entered in a state having jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter is entitled to full faith and credit in
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the courts of another state to the same extent it has by law in the
courts of the state where the judgment was rendered. United States
Constitution Art. 4, §1; Nevada vs. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct.
118259 L.Ed.2d 416, rehear. den., 441 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct 2018, 60
L.Ed.2d 389 (1979).

Schwilling vs. Home, 105 Idaho 294, 296-297, 669 P.2d 183, 185-186 (Idaho, 1983). Full faith
and credit applies equally to judgments by default issued by a sister state. See P&R Enterprises,

Inc. vs. Guard, 102 Idaho 671, 637 P.2d 1167 (Idaho, 1981) involving an Alaska default
judgment filed in Idaho pursuant to § 10-130 1 et. seq. The record does not contain any
opposition by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs Petition in Support of Filing Foreign Judgment
based upon jurisdiction or any other defense to the filing of the foreign judgment. The
Defendants have not moved to set aside the default or to obtain relief from the judgment in either
Idaho or Utah under applicable rules of procedure. Defendants' only motion was the Motion to
Compel Satisfaction ofthe Judgment. R., Vol. I, pp. 34.
The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and issued Judgment
dismissing Defendants' Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment and dismissed the Order
Granting Preliminary Injunction. R., Vol. I, pp. 40-41.
The District Court's decision is based upon an analysis of the EFJA. While a foreign
judgment is "subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or
staying as ajudgment of a district court of this state", pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1302, the
authority ofthe court is more limited than the rules of civil procedure. Wooster vs. Wooster, 399
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W.W.2d 330,333 (S.D., 1987); Matson

VS'.

Matson, 333 N.W. 2d 862 (Minn. 1983). In Wooster,

the collateral attack was based upon Rules 59( a) and 60(b) and other grounds affording relief not
provided by LR.C.P, Rule 58(b). As stated by the Court:
"When a foreign judgment has been appropriately filed the grounds
for vacating it are limited to lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in procurement of the
judgment, satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that
make the judgment invalid or unenforceable; however, the nature,
amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be relitigated in the
state in which enforcement is sought. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied).
Wooster, supra at 333.
The law of the State of California is in accord. See Burns vs. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,
486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 and the Court's analysis of California law.
As noted by the Court in Wooster, foreign judgments are accorded this deference "to
avoid offending the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. (Citations
omitted). Wooster, supra.
Idaho cases have accepted this deference to the forum state. See Grayer vs. Jones, 154
Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (Idaho, 2012) where the Court deferred to the law of the forum state as to
the validity of the renewal of the original judgment overruling G&R Petroleum, Inc. vs.
Clements, 127 Idaho 119,898 P.2d 50 (Idaho, 1996); See also P&R Enterprises, Inc. vs. Guard,
supra where the trial court deferred to a pending appeal in the State of Alaska.
The Defendants have cited no authority contradicting the authority cited by the District
14

Court or the above authority. The decision by the District Court should be affirmed.
V.

THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL

The Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney fees on appeaL The Plaintiff was awarded
its attorney's fees in the Utah judgment, R., VoL I, pp. 13-14; and below R., VoL I, pp. 46-47.
Attorney's fees are also awardable according to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which reads:
In any civil action to recover on ... guaranty... and in any commercial
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party
shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fees to be set by the court,
to be taxed and collected as costs.

The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes.
In Dennett vs. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals
upheld an award of attorney fees under 12-120(3) on the basis that the underlying transaction was
a commercial transaction. The Court of Appeals stated:
The test for application of this statutory directive is 'whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit, that
is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and
constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.'
Spence vs. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776,890 P.2d 714, 727 (1995);
Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784,
792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990).
Here, as admitted by the Defendants, the gravamen ofthe lawsuit was a commercial
transaction and included a recovery upon a guaranty. Therefore, the alleged transaction at issue
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in this case is a civil action to recover upon a guaranty and is a commercial transaction subject to
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the statute.
Plaintiff also requests attorney fees and costs under LA.R 40 and 41. Hagy vs. State, 137
Idaho 618, 624, 51 P .3d 432, 438 (Idaho App. 2002). The Court in Durrant vs. Christensen, 117
Idaho 70, 74-75,785 P.2d 634, 638-639 (Idaho 1990), indicated that, "[S]uch an award is
appropriate when we are left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Citing, Minich vs. Gem State Developers,
Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078,1086 (1979). Plaintiff believes attorney fees should be
awarded as the Defendants have presented facts and arguments not supported by the record on
appeal and have not cited any authority contrary to the analysis of the District Court in granting
the Motion for Reconsideration.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff asks this Court to affinn the Judgment issued June
21,2013.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15 th day of January, 2014.
JONES, CHARTERED

,~

By: ~=r---L--------~~~~----------ttorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15 th day of January, 2014, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was served by the method indicated below upon each
of the following:

Richard Armstrong
Kirton McConkie
Thanksgiving Park Four
2600 W. Executive Parkway, Suite 400
Lehi, DT 84043
Facsimile: (801) 426-2101

_X_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
X
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Email
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